The independent review of the All Blacks' inglorious exit from last year's Rugby World Cup is out - and the 47-page manuscript must surely now become the Magna Carta of New Zealand rugby. 

While there are points that are effectively beacons to the hypocrisy that exists within the corridors of power, there is real depth and substance to this document.

First, the release of the report is ill-timed, when New Zealand’s elite rugby players are preparing for the final rounds of a gruelling Super 14 campaign – and do not need this dread tonic.  The report was always going to be public, if anything to sate a domestic rugby public that is reflecting its mood with the lowest attendance levels and merchandise acquisition in many years. 

'The report was always going to be public, if anything to sate a domestic rugby public that is reflecting its mood with the lowest attendance levels and merchandise acquisition in many years'


The report is all-encompassing – covering the official genesis of the campaign in March 2006, when the battle plans were laid.  Careful emphasis is put on the all-encompassing importance of winning the World Cup.  The Conditioning programme is picked apart in incredible detail – with key focus on what the enemy was doing, as well the poor communication in relation to the supplying unions and the All Blacks management. 

Selection and rotation is analysed, both on the coach’s performance indicators, as well as the player’s views. This uncovers the cardinal sin of the New Zealand command axis.  Consistent emphasis was made, and referred to in the report – of the importance of winning the World Cup. 

The report points to the simple fact that everything was essentially sacrificial to tournament success.  This was shown to be ignored by the NZRU, as they retained Graham Henry despite failing to do essentially his first, second, and third job requirements – win the championship of the world.

The plundering of the New Zealand Super 14 franchises was the catalyst for the domestic union fallout.  Evidence now shows that the conditioning was poorly communicated, not tailored for specific players or positions, and then shown to be a disaster with some Super 14 coaches hesitant to reintroduce All Blacks who were quite simply, rusty or disruptive to a team’s patterns.

The spotlight is placed on the game itself, the performance of  the French, the Blacks and of course the referee.  There is excellent review on the build-up to the game, the selections, the on-field tactics, and of course, the routine of Wayne Barnes.  Basic mistakes were made by the All Blacks with expectations of progressing and running through game scenarios without practising them – case in point the inability to take a drop goal.

The penalty count was 10-2 against the All Blacks, despite over 75 per cent possession and territory, and statistically the dominant team in these areas should have the same supremacy in the penalties.  But it was what it did mentally to the All Blacks that is a persistent point.

The real grit of the report concentrates on the leadership, the development of the All Blacks field generals and the ability to make a decision.  In reference to the New Zealanders’ RWC campaign, the management staff and the analysts go through all aspects. The culture of the team, the development of a leadership core, and, the ability to implement game plans based on set piece or tactical dominance.

But the report damns this headship, best illustrated in Section 7.13 of the report: In the dying minutes of that critical game, the leadership model failed to deliver what was its most important objective - decisions which give the best chance of winning the game. With the benefit of hindsight, the team failed to ensure that the right decisions were taken. As with the philosophy underpinning the leadership model, the players, coaches and management must take responsibility for that.

The most damning aspect of this is the monstrous heat now being placed on Richie McCaw, with Henry being shameful in his management of one of the world’s best players. Yes, Henry publicly states he supports his captain – but the report clearly states that players received instructions ten minutes from time to take the drop goal.

To execute a set play that the All Blacks have no planning or history of performing? To take such an action when your two premier fly-halves are substituted or injured? To complete a kick which the All Blacks management admitted they should have concentrated more on and admitted neglect in the drop kick which every other international team prepared for?
 
This shows the inadequacies of the hyped development of the All Black leadership model and their increased mental toughness.  These attributes were not exhibited, and every All Black rugby fan knows the major faults of this campaign.  Not enough game time, not enough quality opposition, a constant changed XV, not selecting your best team for an elimination quarter-final – we always knew this, and for the worse we have now been proven right.

This report will, if addressed, benefit New Zealand Rugby.  But they must heed this wisdom - for the only mistake is to not admit the mistake, for therefore you shall not learn. 

For all of the beauty of the All Blacks vintage of 2005/2006, we saw it unravelled in World Cup year – let us hope that such irrepressible momentum is not undone again.